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Abstract—Our society becomes increasingly dependent on wireless
communications. The tremendous growth in the number and type of
wirelessly connected devices in a combination with the dropping cost
for performing cyberattacks create new challenges for assuring security
of services and applications provided by the next generation of wireless
communication networks. The situation is complicated even further by
the fact that many end-point Internet of Things (IoT) devices have
very limited resources for implementing security functionality. This
paper addresses one of the aspects of this important, many-faceted
problem - the design of hardware-efficient cryptographic primitives
suitable for the protection of resource-constrained IoT devices. We focus
on cryptographic primitives based on the invertible mappings of type
{0,1, . . . ,2n−1}→ {0,1, . . . ,2n−1}. In order to check if a given mapping
is invertible or not, we generally need an exponential in n number of
steps. In this paper, we derive a sufficient condition for invertibility which
can be checked in O(n2N) time, where N is the size of representation
of the largest function in the mapping. Our results can be used for
constructing cryptographically secure invertible mappings which can be
efficiently implemented in hardware.
Index Terms—Invertible mapping, permutation, Boolean function,
NLFSR
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the problem of constructing hardware-
efficient cryptographic primitives suitable for assuring trustworthiness
of resource-constrained devices used in services and applications
provided by the next generation of wireless communication networks.
The importance of improving security of wireless networks for
our society is hard to overestimate. In 2014, the annual loss to the
global economy from cybercrimes was more than $400 billion [1].
This number can quickly grow larger with the rapid growth of
Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications. In coming years ”things” such
as household appliances, meters, sensors, vehicles, etc. are expected
to be accessible and controlled via local networks or the Internet,
opening an entirely new range of services appealing to users. The
ideas of self-driving cars, health-tracking wearables, and remote
surgeries do not sound like science-fiction any longer. The number
of wirelessly connected devices is expected to grow to a few tens of
billions in the next five years [2].
Unfortunately, the new technologies are appealing to the attackers
as well. As processing power and connectivity become cheaper, the
cost of performing a cyberattack drops, making it easier for adver-
saries of all types to penetrate networks. Attacks are becoming more
frequent, more sophisticated, and more widespread. A connected
household appliance becomes a target for all hackers around the globe
unless appropriate security mechanisms are implemented. Household
appliances typically do not have the same level of protection as
computer systems. A compromised device can potentially be used
as an entry point for a cyberattack on other devices connected to the
network. The first proven cyberattack involving ”smart” household
appliances has been already reported in [3]. In this attack, more
than 750.000 malicious emails targeting enterprises and individuals
worldwide were sent from more than 100.000 consumer devices such
as home-networking routers, multi-media centers, TVs, refrigerators,
etc. No more than 10 emails were initiated from any single IP-
address, making the attack difficult to block based on location. The
attack surface of future IoT with billions of connected devices will
be enormous.
In addition to a larger attack surface, the return value for per-
forming a cyberattack grows. The assets accessible via tomorrow’s
networks (hardware, software, information, and revenue streams) are
expected to be much greater than the ones available today, increasing
incentive for cyber criminals and underground economies [4]. A
growing black market for breached data serves as a further encourage-
ment. The damage caused by an individual actor may not be limited
to a business or reputation, but could have a severe impact on public
safety, national economy, and/or national security.
The tremendous growth in the number and type of wirelessly
connected devices, as well as the increased incentive for performing
attacks change the threat landscape and create new challenges for
security. The situation is complicated even further by the fact that
many end-point IoT devices require utmost efficiency in the use of
communication, computing, storage and energy resources. A typical
IoT device spends most of its ”life” in a sleep mode. It gets activated
at periodic intervals, transmits a small amount of data and then shuts
down again. To satisfy extreme limitations of resource-constrained
IoT devices, very efficient cryptographic primitives for implementing
encryption, data integrity protection, authentication, etc. are required.
Invertible mappings are among the most frequently used primitives
in cryptography [5]. For example, the round function of a block
cipher [6], [7] has to be invertible in order to result in unique
decryption. Stream ciphers [8], [9] and hash functions [10], [11]
use invertible state mappings to prevent incremental reduction of the
entropy of the state.
This paper presents a sufficient condition for invertibility of map-
pings x→ f (x) of type {0,1, . . . ,2n−1}→ {0,1, . . . ,2n−1}. Such a
single-variable 2n-valued mapping can be interpreted as an n-variable
Boolean mapping {0,1}n → {0,1}n in which the Boolean variable
xi ∈ {0,1} represents the bit number i of the input x and the Boolean
function fi : {0,1}n→{0,1} represents the bit number i of the output
f (x), i.e.:  x0. . .
xn−1
→
 f0(x0, . . . ,xn−1). . .
fn−1(x0, . . . ,xn−1)
 (1)
for i∈ {0,1, . . . ,n−1}. For example, the 4-variable Boolean mapping
x0
x1
x2
x3
→

x0⊕1
x1⊕ x0
x2⊕ x0x1
x3⊕ x0x1x2

corresponds to the single-variable 16-valued mapping
x→ x+1 (mod 16),
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where “+” is addition modulo 16. Note that the corresponding single-
variable 2n-valued mapping may not have a closed form.
In order to check if a mapping of type (1) is invertible or not, we
generally need an exponential in n number of steps. The condition
derived in this paper can be checked in O(n2N) time, where N is the
size of representation of the largest Boolean function in the mapping.
So, it can be used for constructing secure invertible mappings with
a small hardware implementation cost. For example, we show how
the presented results can be used in stream cipher design.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes basic
notations used in the sequel. In Section III, we describe previous
work and show that previous methods cannot explain invertibility of
some mappings which can be handled by the presented approach.
Section IV presents the main result. Section V estimates the com-
plexity of checking the presented condition. Section VI shows how
the presented results can be used in stream cipher design. Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout the paper, we use ”⊕” to denote the Boolean XOR, ”·”
to denote the Boolean AND and x to denote the Boolean complement
of x, defined by x = 1⊕ x.
The Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) [12] of a Boolean function f :
{0,1}n→{0,1} (also called positive polarity Reed-Muller canonical
form [13]) is a polynomial in the Galois Field of order 2, GF(2), of
type
f (x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1) =
2n−1
∑
i=0
ci · xi00 · xi11 · . . . · xin−1n−1,
where ci ∈ {0,1} are constants, “·” is the Boolean AND, “∑” is the
Boolean XOR, the vector (i0i1 . . . in−1) is the binary expansion of i,
and xi jj denotes the i jth power of x j defined by x
i j
j = x j for i j = 1
and xi jj = 1 otherwise, for j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n−1}.
The dependence set (or support set [14]) of a Boolean function
f : {0,1}n→{0,1} is defined by
dep( f ) = { j | f |x j=0 6= f |x j=1},
where f |x j=k = f (x0, . . . ,x j−1,k,x j+1, . . . ,xn−1) for k ∈ {0,1}.
A mapping x→ f (x) on a finite set is called invertible if f (x) =
f (y) if, and only if, x = y. Invertible mappings are also called
permutations.
III. PREVIOUS WORK
In this section, we describe previous work on invertible mappings
and show that previous methods cannot explain invertibility of some
mappings which can be handled by the presented approach.
Many methods for constructing different classes of invertible map-
pings are known. The simplest one is to compose simple invertible
operations. A Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) is a typical
example. An SPN consists of S-boxes, which permute input bits
locally, and P-boxes, which diffuse input bits globally. This method
of construction cannot explain the invertibility of, for example, the
following 4-variable mapping
x0
x1
x2
x3
→

x1
x2
x3⊕ x1x2
x0⊕ x3
 (2)
since a non-invertible operation Boolean AND is used.
Feistel [15] proposed a powerful technique which makes possible
constructing invertible mappings from non-invertible basic opera-
tions. It is used in many block ciphers, including DES [16]. The
basic Feistel construction maps two inputs, l and r, into two outputs
as follows: (
l
r
)
→
(
r
l⊕ f (r)
)
where f is any single-variable function. The full Feistel construction
iterates the above mapping any number of times. This method was
extended in several directions, including unbalanced, homogeneous,
heterogeneous, incomplete, and inconsistent Feistel networks [17].
However, the Feistel construction requires at least two variables.
It cannot explain the invertibility of mappings x → f (x) of type
{0,1, . . . ,2n − 1} → {0,1, . . . ,2n − 1}. The presented method can
explain it by looking into the structure of Boolean functions fi
representing the bits of the output f (x).
Shamir [18] introduced an interesting construction based on the
fact that the mapping of type (1) is invertible for almost all inputs if
each fi has the form:
fi(x0, . . . ,xn−1) = hi(x0, . . . ,xi−1)xi +gi(x0, . . . ,xi−1) (mod N)
where gi and hi are arbitrary non-zero i-variable polynomials modulo
a large RSA modulus N. The ”triangular” nature of functions fi makes
it possible to perform the inversion process similarly to the way we
do Gaussian elimination to solve a system of linear equations. This
approach can also handle gi’s and hi’s which mix arithmetic and
Boolean operations [19], [20]. The approach presented in this paper
is similar to the approach of Shamir in that it also uses triangulation
to prove invertibility. However, our functions fi are of the type
fi(x0, . . . ,xn−1) = x j⊕gi(x0, . . . ,xn−1), (3)
where j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n− 1} and gi does not depend on x j. Thus, in
our case, the ith output may depend on the input j such that j > i.
For example, in the mapping defined by equations (2), f2 depends
on x1,x2 and x3.
Shamir’s construction was further extended by Klimov and
Shamir [19], [20] to a class on invertible mappings based on T-
functions. A single-variable function f (x) of type {0,1, . . . ,2n−1}→
{0,1, . . . ,2n− 1} is defined to be a T-function if each of its output
bits fi−1(x) depends only on the first i input bits x0,x1, . . . ,xi−1:
x0
x1
x2
. . .
xn−1
→

f0(x0)
f1(x0,x1)
f2(x0,x1,x2)
. . .
fn−1(x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1)
 .
A T-function is invertible if, and only if, each output bit fi can be
represented as
fi(x0, . . . ,xi) = xi⊕gi(x0, . . . ,xi−1).
This fundamental result inspired the construction which we present
in this paper. The reader will easily notice that, in our construc-
tion (3), functions gi’s are T-functions while functions fi’s are not
if j > i. Another difference is that Klimov and Shamir targeted
software implementation and therefore focused on mappings whose
expression can be evaluated by a program with the minimal number
of instructions. We target the hardware implementation. Therefore,
we are interested in minimizing the number of Boolean operations
in the expressions of Boolean functions representing output bits. The
construction method which we present can be used as a starting point
for constructing nonlinear invertible mappings which have an efficient
hardware implementation.
Another group of construction methods consider permutation poly-
nomials which involve only the arithmetic operation of addition,
...n−2n−1 0
output
clock
feedback function f
Fig. 1: The structure of an n-bit Non-Linear Feedback Shift Register.
subtraction, and multiplication. Permutation polynomials are well-
studied in mathematics. Hermite [21] made a substantial progress in
characterizing univariate permutation polynomials modulo a prime
p. Dickson [22] described all univariate polynomials with degrees
smaller than 5. However, the problem remains unsolved for high
degree polynomials modulo a large prime p.
The problem appears simpler for the ring of integers modulo 2n.
Rivest [23] provided a complete characterization of all univariate
permutation polynomials modulo 2n. He proved that a polynomial
p(x) = a0 +a1x+ . . .+adx
d
with integral coefficients is a permutation polynomial for n > 2 if,
and only if, a1 is odd, (a2 +a4 + . . .) is even and (a3 +a5 + . . .) is
even. His powerful algebraic proof technique was further generalized
by Klimov and Shamir [19], [20] to polynomials of type
p(x) = a0 ◦a1x◦ . . .◦adxd ,
where ◦ ∈ {+,−,⊕}, which mix arithmetic and Boolean operations.
However, since the resulting polynomials are T-functions, they do
not cover the construction method presented in this paper for the
case when ith output depends on the input j such that j > i.
Finally, we would like to discuss the relation between the map-
pings of type (1) and the state mappings generated by Non-Linear
Feedback Shift Registers (NLFSRs) [24]. An n-bit NLFSR consists
of n binary stages, each capable of storing 1 bit of information, a
nonlinear Boolean function, called feedback function, and a clock
(see Figure 1). At each clock cycle, the stage n− 1 is updated to
the value computed by the feedback function. The rest of the stages
shift the content of the previous stage. Thus, an n-bit NLFSR with
the feedback functions f implements the state mapping of type
x0
x1
. . .
xn−1
→

x1
x2
. . .
f (x0, . . . ,xn−1)
 .
where the variable xi represents the value of the stage i, for i ∈
{0,1, . . . ,n−1}.
It is well-known [25] that an n-bit NLFSR is invertible if, and only
if, its feedback function is of type
f (x0, . . . ,xn−1) = x0⊕g(x1,x2, . . . ,xn−1).
The mappings considered in this paper can be implemented by a
more general type of non-linear state machines, shown in Figure 2.
Since the content of stages is not any longer shifted from one stage
to the next, but rather it is updated by some arbitrary functions, such
registers are not called shift registers any longer. Instead, they are
called binary machines [25] or registers with non-linear update [26].
Binary machines are typically smaller and faster than NLFSRs gen-
erating the same sequence [27], [28]. For example, the 4-bit NLFSR
with the feedback function f (x0,x1,x2,x3) = x0 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x1x2 ⊕ x2x3
...
...
output
clock
0
f0
fn−2
fn−1
n−2
n feedback functions
n−1
n stages
Fig. 2: The structure of an n-bit binary machine.
generates the same set of sequences as the 4-bit binary machine
implementing the 4-variable mapping defined by equations (2). We
can see that the binary machine uses 3 binary Boolean operations,
while the NLFSR uses 5 binary Boolean operations. Furthermore,
the depth of feedback functions of the binary machine is smaller that
the depth of the feedback function of the NLFSR. Thus, the binary
machine has a smaller propagation delay than the NLFSR.
IV. CONDITIONS FOR INVERTIBILITY
As we mentioned in Section III, it is well-known how to construct
invertible NLFSRs [25]. An n-bit NLFSR is invertible if, and only
if, its feedback function is of type:
f (x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1) = x0⊕g(x1,x2, . . . ,xn−1). (4)
The proof is simple, because every two consecutive states of an
NLFSR overlap in n− 1 positions. This implies that each state can
have only two possible predecessors and two possible successors.
If f is in the form (4), then the NLFSR states which correspond
to the binary n-tuples x = (x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1) and y = (x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1)
always have different successors. The values of f (x) and f (y) depend
on the value of g(x1, . . . ,xn−1) and on the value of x0. The value of
g(x1, . . . ,xn−1) is the same for x and y. The value of x0 is different
for x and y. Thus, f (x) 6= f (y). It is also easy to see that, if both x
and y have the same successor, f cannot have the form (4).
In the general case of mappings {0,1}n→ {0,1}n, any binary n-
tuple can have 2n possible predecessors and 2n possible successors.
Therefore, to guarantee that a mapping {0,1}n→{0,1}n is invertible,
we have to check that, for all x,y∈ {0,1}n, x 6= y implies that fi(x) 6=
fi(y), for some i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n−1}. This clearly requires the number
of steps which is exponential in n. The main contribution of this
paper is a more restricted sufficient condition which can be checked
in O(n2N) steps. To formulate this condition, we first introduce the
notion of a free variable of a function.
Definition 1 (Free variable): A variable xi ∈ dep( f ) is called a
free variable if f can decomposed as
f (x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1) = xi⊕g(x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1).
where xi 6∈ dep(gi).
Definition 2 (Set of free variables): The set of free variables of f ,
Φ( f ), contains all free variables of f
Φ( f ) = {xi | xi is a free variable of f}.
Now we are ready to formulate the following sufficient condition
for invertibility.
Theorem 1: A mapping of type (1) is invertible if the following
two conditions hold:
1) For each i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n−1}, fi is of type
fi(x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1) = x ji ⊕gi(x0,x1, . . . ,xn−1), (5)
where x ji ∈Φ( fi).
2) Functions f0, f1, . . . , fn−1 can be re-ordered as fi0 , fi1 , . . . , fin−1
to satisfy the property
dep(gik )⊆

/0, for k = 0
k−1⋃
j=0
dep( fi j ), for 1≤ k ≤ n−1
where “∪” stands for the union.
Proof: By contradiction.
Suppose that there exist a non-invertible mapping of type (1) for
which the conditions of the theorem hold. Then, this mapping is of
type 
xi0
xi1
xi2
. . .
xin−1
→

x j0 ⊕gi0
x j1 ⊕gi1(x j0)
x j2 ⊕gi2(x j0 ,x j1)
. . .
x jn−1 ⊕gin−1(x j0 ,x j1 . . . ,x jn−2)
 (6)
where x jk ∈Φ( fik ), for k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n−1}.
Since the mapping (6) in non-invertible, there exist at least
two input assignments a = (ai0 ,ai1 , . . . ,ain−1) ∈ {0,1}n and a′ =
(a′i0 ,a
′
i1 , . . . ,a
′
in−1) ∈ {0,1}n, a 6= a′, which are mapped into the same
output. We analyzing (6) row by row, we can conclude that:
• ai1 → a j1 ⊕ gi0 and a′i0 → a′j0 ⊕ gi0 and a j0 ⊕ gi0 = a′j0 ⊕ gi0
implies a j0 = a
′
j0
• ai1 → a j1⊕gi1(a j0) and a′i1 → a′j1⊕gi1(a′j0) and a j1⊕gi1(a j0) =
a′j1 ⊕gi1(a′j0) and a j0 = a′j0 implies a j1 = a′j1
• . . .
• ain−1 → a jn−1 ⊕ gin−1(a j0 ,a j1 . . . ,a jn−2) and a′in−1 → a′jn−1 ⊕
gin−1(a
′
j0 ,a
′
j1 . . . ,a
′
jn−2) and a jn−1 ⊕ gin−1(a j0 ,a j1 . . . ,a jn−2) =
a′jn−1 ⊕ gin−1(a′j0 ,a′j1 . . . ,a′jn−2) and a j0 = a′j0 , a j1 = a′j1 , . . .
a jn−2 = a
′
jn−2 implies a jn−1 = a
′
jn−1 .
Therefore, a = a′. We reached a contradiction. Thus, the assumption
that there exist a non-invertible mapping of type (1) for which the
conditions of the theorem hold is not true.
2
An example of mapping which satisfies the conditions of Theo-
rem 1 is: 
x0
x1
x2
. . .
xn−1
→

x1⊕g0
x2⊕g1(x1)
x3⊕g2(x1,x2)
. . .
x0⊕gn−1(x1,x2 . . . ,xn−1)
 (7)
The reader may notice that mappings defined by Theorem 1 can
be obtained by re-labeling variables in a T-function. The re-labeling
is given by the ordering of free variables. So, the mapping (5) can
be viewed as a composition of a bit permutation and a T-function.
Since there are n! bit permutations, the class of invertible mappings
considered in this paper is by a factor of n! larger than the class of
invertible mappings based on T-functions.
Clearly, the re-labeling of variables does not change the implemen-
tation cost of a mapping. However, it might drastically change the
cycle structure of the underlying state transition graph, as illustrated
0000 0010 0100 0110
1110110010101000
11010001 0011
0101 111110111001
0111
Fig. 3: The state transition graph of the mapping (8).
1100
0110
1111
1001
1011
1000
0100
0010
1101
1110
0101
0011
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0001
0000
Fig. 4: The state transition graph of the mapping (9).
by the following example. Consider the following 4-variable mapping
based on a T-function:
x0
x1
x2
x3
→

x0
x1
x2⊕ x0
x3⊕ x0⊕ x0x1
 . (8)
This mapping has a quite uninteresting state transition graph shown
in Figure 3. Let us re-label the variables as (0,1,2,3)→ (1,2,3,0).
We get the mapping:
x0
x1
x2
x3
→

x1
x2
x3⊕ x1
x0⊕ x1⊕ x1x2
 . (9)
which has the state transition graph shown in Figure 4. All states,
except the all-0 state, are included in one cycle. If we implement
this mapping by the binary machine shown in Figure 2 and initialize
the binary machine to any non-zero state, then its output generates
a pseudo-random sequence with period 15 which satisfies the first
two randomness postulates of Golomb [25], namely the balance
property and the run property. No sequence generated by a nonlinear
Boolean function satisfy the third randomness postulate (two-level
autocorrelation property). Therefore, the mapping we obtained by
re-labeling has much more interesting statistical properties than the
original mapping.
The cycle structure of a mapping is important for some crypto-
graphic applications, e.g. stream ciphers [29]. Obviously, if we iterate
a mapping a large number of times, we do not want the sequence of
generated states to be trapped in a short cycle. It is worth noting that
formal verification tools based on reachability analysis can be adopted
for finding short cycles in a state transition graph. There are dedicated
tools to compute the number and length of cycles in state transition
graphs of synchronous sequential networks, e.g. BNS [30] which is
based on SAT-based bounded model checking and BooleNet [31]
which is based on Binary Decision Diagrams.
The mappings defined by Theorem 1 are invertible for any choice
of Boolean functions gi(x0,x2 . . . ,xi−1). The smaller is the number
of Boolean operations in the expressions of gi’s, the smaller is its
hardware implementation cost. Note, that we are not restricted to
represent gi’s in ANF. Any Boolean expression combining AND, OR,
NOT and XOR can be used. Multi-level logic optimization tools,
such as UC Berkeley tool ABC [32] can be applied to transform
the ANF or other Boolean expression representing the function into
an optimized multi-level expression. Clearly, the choice of gi’s will
be guided not only by the hardware cost, but also by other criteria
determining the cryptographic strength of the resulting function, e.g.
nonlinearity, correlation immunity, algebraic degree, etc. (see [12] for
requirements on cryptographically strong functions).
Finally, we would like to point out that the conditions of Theorem 1
are sufficient, but not necessary conditions for invertibility. For
example, the following 4-variable mapping is invertible, but it does
not satisfy them:
x0
x1
x2
x3
→

x1⊕ x0⊕ x0x2
x2⊕ x1⊕ x3
x3⊕ x0x2
x0
 .
V. CONDITION CHECKING
Next, let us estimate the number of steps required to check the
conditions of Theorem 1. Suppose that all Boolean functions of the
mapping are represented in ANF. Let N be the ANF size of the largest
function in the mapping. The size of an ANF is defined as the total
number of variables appearing in the ANF. For example, the ANF
x1⊕ x1x2 is of size 3.
Consider the pseudocode shown as Algorithm 1. Φ is a set which
keeps track of variables which are identified as free for some fi.
If this set is implemented as a hash table of size n, then adding a
variable to the set or checking if a variable belongs to the set can be
done in constant time.
In the first for-loop, we check if each fi is of type fi = x j or
fi = x j⊕ 1, for some j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n− 1}. If yes, we add x j to the
set Φ and mark fi. Since the steps 4, 5, 6 and 7 can be done in O(1)
time, the complexity of the first for-loop is O(n).
If none of the functions fi are marked during the first for-loop,
the algorithm terminates with the conclusion that the conditions of
Theorem 1 are not satisfied.
In the second for-loop, for each non-marked fi, we check if it is of
type (5) and if every xk ∈ dep(gi) belongs to Φ. If yes, add x j to Φ,
mark fi, and return to step 13. The steps 15, 17 and 18 can be done
in O(1) time. The step 16 requires O(N) time. Thus, the complexity
of the second for-loop is O(nN). Since we return to the step 13 at
most n times, the overall complexity of steps 13-22 is O(n2N).
In the third for-loop, we check if all fi are marked. If yes, the
mapping is invertible. Otherwise, the algorithm returns ”conditions
are not satisfied”. Since the conditions of Theorem 1 are sufficient,
but not necessary conditions for invertibility, in this case the mapping
may or may not be invertible. The complexity of the third for-loop
is O(n). We can conclude that overall complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(n2N).
Algorithm 1 Checks conditions of Theorem 1 for a mapping of type (1) in
which all Boolean functions are represented in ANF
1: Φ= /0;
2: flag = 0;
3: for every i from 0 to n−1 do
4: if fi = x j or fi = x j⊕1, for some j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n−1} then
5: add x j to Φ
6: mark fi
7: flag = 1;
8: end if
9: end for
10: if flag = 0 then
11: Return ”Conditions are not satisfied”
12: end if
13: loop:
14: for every i from 0 to n−1 do
15: if fi is not marked then
16: if fi is of type (5) and xk ∈Φ ∀xk ∈ dep(gi) then
17: add x j to Φ
18: mark fi
19: go to loop
20: end if
21: end if
22: end for
23: for every i from 0 to n−1 do
24: if fi is marked then
25: continue
26: else
27: Return ”Conditions are not satisfied”
28: end if
29: end for
30: Return ”Mapping is invertible”
VI. APPLICATIONS
In this section we show how the presented results can be used in
stream cipher design.
A possible way to construct a key stream generator for a stream
cipher is to run several FSRs in parallel and to combine their outputs
with a nonlinear Boolean function [12]. The resulting structure is
called a combination generator. If the periods of FSRs are pairwise
co-prime, then the period of the resulting key stream generator is
equal to the product of periods of FRSs [33]. Examples of stream
ciphers based on combination generators are VEST [34], Achterbahn-
128/80 [35], and the cipher [36]. VEST uses 16 10-bit and 16 11-bit
NLFSRs. Achterbahn-128/80 uses 13 NLFSRs of size from 21 to 33
bits. The cipher from [36] uses 10 NLFSRs of size 22-29, 31 and 32
bits.
At present it is not known how to construct large NLFSRs with
a guaranteed long period. Existing algorithms cover special cases
only, e.g. [37], [38]. Small NLFSRs which are used in combination
generators are computed by a random search. Lists of n-bit NLFSRs
of size < 25 bits with the period 2n− 1 whose feedback functions
contain up to 6 binary Boolean operations in their ANFs are available
in [39]. It is known that, for example, there are no 20-bit NLFSRs
with the period 220−1 whose feedback function contains only four
binary Boolean operations in its ANF (i.e. implementable with four
2-input gates).
Using Algorithm 1 to bound random search, in 12 hours we were
able to find 63 20-variable nonlinear invertible mappings with the
period 220 − 1 whose functions fi contain no more than 4 binary
Boolean operations in their ANFs in total. Two representatives are:
1) f16 = x17⊕ x4x11, f13 = x14⊕ x13, f4 = x5⊕ x1.
2) f19 = x0⊕ x16, f15 = x16⊕ x3⊕ x1x15.
The omitted functions are of type fi = x(i+1) mod 20, for i ∈
{0,1, . . . ,19}. This shows that Algorithm 1 is useful for finding
nonlinear invertible mappings with a small hardware implementation
cost. Other important properties, such as nonlinearity, correlation
immunity, algebraic degree, etc., can then be used to further guide
the search.
VII. CONCLUSION
We derived a sufficient condition for invertibility of mappings of
type {0,1, . . . ,2n − 1} → {0,1, . . . ,2n − 1} which can be checked
in O(n2N) steps, where N is the ANF size of the largest Boolean
function in the mapping. The presented method can be used as a
starting point for constructing nonlinear invertible mappings which
can be efficiently implemented in hardware.
Future work remains on constructing new cryptographic primitives
based on the presented class of invertible mappings and evaluating
their security and hardware cost. We also plan to investigate the
usability our results in reversible computing.
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